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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Michael Dewayne Weathers appeals from the district court's order revoking his
probation. On appeal, he argues that the Idaho Supreme Court denied his due process
rights when it denied his motion to augment the record, and that the district court
abused its sentencing discretion.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
Weathers, a 36-year-old man, sexually molested a 13-year-old girl by kissing her
and fondling her breasts while she was at his house visiting his daughter. (PSI, pp.2-3.)
The state charged Weathers with sexual abuse of a minor and an enhancement for
being a persistent violator of the law. (R., pp.40-43.) Pursuant to a plea agreement,
Weathers pleaded guilty to the sexual abuse charge and the state dismissed the
persistent violator enhancement.

(R., pp.42, 64-72.)

In July 2010, the district court

entered judgment against Weathers and imposed a sentence of ten years with three
years fixed, but retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.75-78.) At the end of the period of retained
jurisdiction, in January 2010, the district court suspended its sentence and placed
Weathers on probation for a period of ten years. (R., pp .81-86.)
In June 2010, the state alleged that Weathers violated the terms and conditions
of his probation by consuming alcohol, failing to report his contact with police to his
probation officer, viewing pornography, using the internet, and entering into a sexual
relationship with a woman named C.J. without the approval of his probation officer or
therapist.

(R., pp.90-91.)

Weathers admitted the violations.

(R., pp.97-98.)

In

February 2011, the district court found that Weathers had violated the terms and
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conditions of his probation, but continued him on probation with the additional condition
that any relationship with C.J. needed to be approved by Weathers' probation officer or
therapist, explaining that "[a]ny unapproved association will be considered a violation of
the terms and conditions of probation." (R., pp.106-09.)
In August 2011, the state alleged that Weathers again violated the terms and
conditions of his probation by continuing to have a relationship with C.J. without the
approval of his probation officer or therapist, viewing pornography, getting suspended
from his treatment program due to his "continued violations of treatment rules and
guidelines," and frequenting a bar. (R., pp.113-15.) Weathers denied the allegations
and the district court scheduled an evidentiary hearing.

(R., pp.117-18.)

After two

hearings, the district court found that Weathers had violated his probation as alleged.
(12/13/2011 Tr., p.166, L.12 - p.168, L.1.) At the subsequent disposition hearing, the
district court revoked Weathers' probation and executed his underlying sentence. (R.,
pp.144-49.)
Weathers filed a notice of appeal timely from the district court's order revoking
probation. (R., pp.154-56)
Pending appeal, Weathers filed a motion to augment the settled record with
transcripts from (1) the January 11, 2010 jurisdictional review hearing, (2) the October
26, 2010 probation violation admission hearing, (3) the February 2, 2011 probation
violation disposition hearing, (4) the December 1, 2011 evidentiary hearing, and (5) the
continued evidentiary hearing, held on December 13, 2011. (Motion To Augment And
To Suspend The Briefing Schedule And Statement In Support Thereof (hereinafter
"Motion To Augment"), filed June 27, 2012.) The state did not object to the preparation
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and inclusion of the transcripts from the evidentiary hearings, but objected to Weathers'
motion to prepare and include all the other requested transcripts. (Objection In Part To
"Motion To Augment And To Suspend The Briefing Schedule And Statement In Support
Thereof," filed July 31, 2012.) The Idaho Supreme Court granted Weathers' motion for
the transcripts from the evidentiary hearings, but denied his request for the remaining
transcripts. (Order, filed August 13, 2012.)

3

ISSUES
Weathers states the issues on appeal as:
1.
Did the Idaho Supreme Court deny Mr. Weathers due process and
equal protection when it denied his Motion to Augment with the requested
transcripts?
2.
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it revoked Mr.
Weathers' probation?
3.
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it failed to reduce Mr.
Weathers' sentence sua sponte upon revoking probation?
(Appellant's brief, p.4.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.
Has Weathers failed to establish that the Idaho Supreme Court violated his
constitutional rights by denying his motion to augment the appellate record with
irrelevant transcripts?
2.
Has Weathers failed to establish that the district court abused its sentencing
discretion either by revoking his probation or by not sua sponte reducing his sentence?

4

ARGUMENT
I.
Weathers' Claim That His Due Process And Equal Protection Rights Were Violated By
The Denial Of His Motion To Augment The Appellate Record With Irrelevant Transcripts
Lacks Merit
A.

Introduction
After the appellate record was settled, Weathers filed a motion to augment the

record with the as-yet unprepared transcripts of the January 11, 2010 jurisdictional
review hearing, the October 26, 2010 probation violation admission hearing, the
February 2, 2011 probation violation disposition hearing, and the evidentiary hearings
held, respectively, on December 1, 2011 and December 13, 2011.

(Motion To

Augment) The Idaho Supreme Court granted Weathers' motion as it related to the
evidentiary hearing transcripts but denied his motion as it related to the other
transcripts. {Order, filed August 13, 2012.)
Weathers now contends that, by denying his motion to augment the appellate
record with transcripts from the January 11, 2010 jurisdictional review hearing, the
October 26, 2010 probation violation admission hearing, and the February 2, 2011
probation violation

disposition

hearing, the Idaho Supreme Court violated

his

constitutional rights to due process and equal protection and denied him effective
assistance of counsel on appeal. (Appellant's brief, pp.5-17.) Weathers' argument is
without merit. First, if this case is assigned to the Court of Appeals, Weathers has failed
to provide any basis for the Court to reconsider the Idaho Supreme Court's order
denying his motion.

Alternatively, on the merits, due process and equal protection

require the state only to provide a record sufficient for appellate review of the errors
alleged. Because the denied transcripts are not relevant to, much less necessary for,
5

appellate review of the district court's order revoking Weathers' probation (the only
issue over which this Court has jurisdiction), Weathers has failed to show any error in
the Idaho Supreme Court's denial of his motion to augment.

B.

Standard Of Review
The standard of appellate review applicable to constitutional issues is one of

deference to factual findings, unless they are clearly erroneous, but free review of
whether constitutional requirements have been satisfied in light of the facts found. State
v. Bromgard, 139 Idaho 375, 380, 79 P.3d 734, 739 (Ct. App. 2003); State v. Smith, 135
Idaho 712, 720, 23 P.3d 786, 794 (Ct. App. 2001 ).

C.

If This Case Is Assigned To The Idaho Court Of Appeals. Weathers Has Failed
To Provide Any Basis For The Court To Reconsider The Idaho Supreme Court's
Order Denying His Motion To Augment
In State v. Morgan, Docket No. 39057, 2012 Op. No. 38 (Ct. App. July 10, 2012),

review denied November 29, 2012, the Idaho Court of Appeals considered a claim that
the Idaho Supreme Court denied the appellant his constitutional rights by denying his
motion to augment the record on appeal with various transcripts. In doing so, the Court
"disclaim[ed] any authority to review, and, in effect, reverse an Idaho Supreme Court
decision made on a motion made prior to assignment of the case to [the Idaho Court of
Appeals] on the ground that the Supreme Court decision was contrary to the state or
federal constitutions or other law."

Morgan at 3.

Such an undertaking, the Court

explained, "would be tantamount to the Court of Appeals entertaining an 'appeal' from
an Idaho Supreme Court decision and is plainly beyond the purview of this Court."

~

The Court, however, "deem[ed] it within [its] authority ... to evaluate and rule on [a]
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renewed motion" if, for example, "the completed appellant's brief and/or respondent's
briefs have refined, clarified or expanded issues on appeal in such a way as to
demonstrate the need for additional records or transcripts, or where new evidence is
presented to support a renewed motion." kL_ To the extent this case is assigned to the
Court of Appeals, Weathers' arguments fail to provide any basis for the Court to
reconsider the Idaho Supreme Court's order denying his motion to augment the record
with transcripts that are unnecessary to the resolution of this appeal.

D.

In The Alternative, Weathers Has Failed To Show Any Constitutional Entitlement
To The Requested Augmentation
Even if this Court considers the merits of Weathers' claim, all of his arguments

fail.

As in Morgan, Weathers argues that he is entitled to the additional transcripts

because, he claims, the failure to provide them is a violation of his constitutional rights
to due process, equal protection, and the effective assistance of appellate counsel.
(Appellant's Brief, pp.4-16.) This is not "new information or justification for [Weathers']
motion to augment the record." See Morgan at 3. Even if it were, his arguments still
lack merit
A defendant in a criminal case has a right to a record on appeal that is sufficient
11

for adequate appellate review of the errors alleged regarding the proceedings below."
State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 462, 50 P.3d 472, 477 (2002) (citations omitted). The
state, however, "will not be required to expend its funds unnecessarily" to provide
transcripts or other items that "will not be germane to consideration of the appeal."
Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487, 495 (1963); see also M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S.
102, 112 n.5 (1996) ("an indigent defendant is entitled only to those parts of the trial
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record that are germane to consideration of the appeal") (internal citations omitted). To
demonstrate that the record is not sufficient, the defendant must show that any
omissions from the record prejudiced his ability to pursue the appeal. State v. Polson,
92 Idaho 615, 620-21, 448 P.2d 229, 234-35 (1968).

To show prejudice, Weathers

"must present something more than gross speculation that the transcripts were requisite
to a fair appeal." Scott v. Elo, 302 F.3d 598, 605 (6th Cir. 2002).
Weathers filed a timely appeal from the district court's January 19, 2012 order
revoking his probation. (See R., p.154 (appeal filed on February 2, 2012).) Weathers
argues that the Idaho Supreme Court denied him due process and equal protection by
denying his motion to augment the appellate record with the as-yet unprepared
transcripts of the January 11, 2010 jurisdictional review hearing, the October 26, 2010
probation violation admission hearing, and the February 2, 2011 probation violation
disposition hearing (Appellant's brief, pp.5-17), but he has failed to explain, much less
demonstrate, how those transcripts are necessary to decide the issues over which this
Court has jurisdiction on this appeal. There is no indication that the trial court relied
upon anything said at those previous hearings as a basis for its decision to revoke his
probation.

Because the as-yet unprepared transcripts were never presented to the

district court in relation to the revocation of Weathers' probation, they were never part of
the record before the district court and are not properly considered for the first time on
appeal. See State v. Mitchell, 124 Idaho 374, 376 n.1, 859 P.2d 972, 974 n.1 (Ct. App.
1993) (in rendering a decision on the issues raised on appeal, the appellate court is
"limited to review of the record made below" and "will not consider new evidence that
was never before the trial court"); see also Huerta v. Huerta, 127 Idaho 77, 80, 896 P.2d
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985, 988 (Ct App. 1995) ("It is not the role of this Court to entertain new allegations of
fact and consider new evidence."). Weathers has failed to show how the requested
transcripts are relevant to any issue raised on appeal.
Weathers relies on the Court of Appeals' statement from State v. Hanington, 148
Idaho 26, 28, 218 P.3d 5, 8 (Ct. App. 2009), that appellate "review [of] a sentence that is
ordered into execution following a period of probation" is based "upon the facts existing
when the sentence was imposed as well as events occurring between the original
sentencing and the revocation of probation." (Appellant's brief, p.13.) According to
Weathers, this language from Hanington requires augmentation with transcripts of all
hearings from sentencing to the revocation of his probation. (Appellant's brief, pp.1315.) The Court in Morgan, however, held that this interpretation of Hanington is too
broad.

Morgan at 4.

The Court clarified that although it "will not arbitrarily confine

[itself] to only those facts which arise after sentencing to the time of the revocation of
probation . . . that does not mean that all proceedings in the trial court up to and
including sentencing are germane."

kl

(emphasis original).

Rather, the Court will

simply consider the portions of the record before the trial court which are relevant to the
ultimate issue on appeal, in this case, the revocation of Weathers' probation.

kl

Weathers also relies on State v. Warren, 123 Idaho 20, 843 P.2d 170 (Ct. App.
1992), as "[f]urther support for [his] position." (Appellant's brief, pp.13-14.) Weathers'
reliance on Warren is misplaced.

Warren was placed on probation following an

aggravated battery conviction. Warren, 123 Idaho at 21, 843 P.2d at 171. Two years
later, Warren was charged with a new crime and his probation was revoked in his
aggravated battery case, but his sentence was reduced.

9

kl

Despite the reduction,

Warren filed a Rule 35 motion, which was denied.

!sL

On appeal, Warren challenged

the denial of his Rule 35 motion in the aggravated battery case.

In addressing this

claim, the Court of Appeals noted the absence of either a presentence report or a
transcript from the sentencing hearing in the aggravated battery case and concluded
that "[w]ithout a more complete record and no argument by Warren as to why the
sentence was unreasonable," there was no support for Warren's claim that the district
court abused its discretion in relation to the sentence reduction or the denial of Rule 35
relief.

!sL
Weathers argues that Warren supports his position that he is entitled to the

requested transcripts because the lack of them "functions as a procedural bar to the
review of Mr. Weathers' appellate sentencing claims on the merits." (Appellant's brief,
p.14.)

This argument reflects either a misrepresentation or a misunderstanding of

Warren as the Court in Warren clearly addressed the sentencing claim before it, but
affirmed due to the lack of a "more complete record" or "argument by Warren as to why
the sentence was unreasonable." Warren, 123 Idaho at 21, 843 P.2d at 171. Weathers
also claims "the Warren opinion indicates that [the lack of transcripts] would be
presumed to support the district court's decision to execute the original sentence."
(Appellant's brief, p.14.)

Nothing in Warren suggests that the absence of irrelevant

transcripts would be presumed to support the district court's opinion in this case.
Citing Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971 ), Weathers also claims that
if he can make a "colorable argument" that he needs "items" to complete a record, the
state must "prove that the requested items are not necessary for the appeal."
(Appellant's brief, p.10.) Mayer does not support this argument. Mayer was convicted
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on non-felony charges punishable only by a fine and he appealed, challenging the
sufficiency of evidence and asserting a claim of prosecutorial misconduct.

~

at 190.

The appellate court denied his request for a trial transcript at government expense on
the basis of a local rule providing that verbatim transcripts of trial proceedings would be
provided at government expense only for felonies.

~

at 191-93. The issue was not

whether Mayer was entitled to a record of his trial, but whether he was entitled to a
~

verbatim transcript of his trial.

at 193. The Court noted it had addressed a similar

issue in Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963), where the Court held that the
government need not provide transcripts that were not "germane to consideration of the
appeal, and a State will not be required to expend its funds unnecessarily in such
circumstances."

Mayer, 404 U.S. at 194 (quoting Draper, 372 U.S. at 495-96).

However, "the State must provide a full verbatim record where that is necessary to
assure the indigent as effective an appeal as would be available to the defendant with
resources to pay his own way."

~

at 195. "Moreover, where the grounds of appeal, as

in this case, make out a colorable need for a complete transcript, the burden is on the
State to show that only a portion of the transcript or an 'alternative' will suffice for an
effective appeal on those grounds."

~

Thus, if it is not clear on the existing record, an indigent appellant must establish
that a record of certain "proceedings" is germane to the appeal.

~

at 194. Only after

the germaneness of the requested record of the proceedings is established and a
colorable need for a verbatim record is shown by the appellant will the burden shift to
the state to demonstrate that a partial transcript or some record other than a verbatim
transcript will be adequate.

~

at 194-95;

also Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226,

11

227-28 (1971) (in deciding whether a requested record is necessary, the Court should
consider the "value of the transcript to the defendant in connection with the appeal," but
the standard does not require "a showing of need tailored to the facts of the particular
case" and the Court may take notice of the importance of a transcript).
Weathers' appeal is timely from the district court's order revoking his probation.
The record related to that order is complete. (See, ~ ' R., pp.90-91, 97-98, 106-09,
113-15, 144-49; generally PSI; 12/1/2011 Tr.; and 12/13/2011 Tr.) Weathers has failed
to establish that the requested transcripts are necessary to create an adequate
appellate record to review the court's order.

Nothing in the record suggests that the

transcripts Weathers requested in his augmentation were relied upon by the district
court in relation to the revocation of Weathers' probation. Because Weathers failed to
make a showing of germaneness and colorable need for the requested transcripts,
there is no burden on the state. Because all of the evidence before the district court is
in the appellate record, that record is adequate for appellate review, and Weathers has
failed to establish a violation of his due process rights. 1 See Strand, 137 Idaho at 463,
50 P.3d at 478.
Weathers also argues that the denial of his request to augment the record on
appeal with irrelevant transcripts denied him equal protection. (Appellant's brief, pp.5-

1

As a component of his due process claim, Weathers also argues that the denial of his
motion to augment the record with the requested transcripts has deprived him of
effective assistance of counsel on appeal. (Appellant's brief, pp.15-17.) Because
Weathers has failed to show that the requested transcripts are necessary, or even
relevant, for appellate review of the district court's order revoking his probation, there is
no possibility that the denial of the motion to augment has deprived Weathers of
effective assistance of counsel on this appeal.
12

17.)

The Court of Appeals in Morgan rejected the argument that equal protection

mandates augmentation of all transcripts the appellant desires, stating:
Morgan was not denied the transcripts because of indigency. Morgan was
afforded the opportunity to designate not only the standard clerk's record,
but also additional records necessary for inclusion in the clerk's record on
appeal. He had time to review the record and make any objections,
corrections, additions, or deletions prior to settling of the record, pursuant
to I.A.R. 29(a). Morgan's failure to fully and timely utilize the Idaho
Appellate Rules, and his failure to demonstrate the need for the transcripts
in his motion to augment the record, precluded him from including the first
probation violation hearing transcripts, not his indigency. Morgan's motion
to augment failed to make a showing that any appellant, indigent or
otherwise, would be entitled to the record as requested.
Morgan at 5. Weathers' equal protection claim fails for the same reasons.
While Weathers acknowledges that Morgan "does directly deal with the issues
raised in this appeal.'' he argues, "at this point this case is not final." (Appellant's brief,
pp.12-13.) Morgan is now final. (State v. Morgan, Docket No. 39057, Order Denying
Petition for Review, filed November 29, 2012.)
Weathers is entitled to a record adequate for appellate review of the district
court's order revoking his probation and nothing more. He has failed to show that the
requested transcripts are relevant to appellate review, much less necessary for
adequate appellate review.

Having failed to make any such showing, his motion to

augment the record with irrelevant transcripts that were not relied upon by the district
court was properly denied. Having failed to show his due process and equal protection
rights were implicated, much less violated, by that denial, Weathers has failed to show
any basis for relief.
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11.
Weathers Has Failed To Establish An Abuse Of The Court's Sentencing Discretion
A.

Introduction
Weathers asserts that the district court abused its sentencing discretion by

revoking his probation or, alternatively, by not sua sponte reducing his sentence upon
revoking probation. (Appellant's brief, pp.17-21.) Weathers has failed to establish an
abuse of the district court's discretion.

B.

Standard Of Review
"Sentencing decisions are reviewed for an abuse of discretion." State v. Moore,

131 Idaho 814,823,965 P.2d 174, 183 (1998) (citing State v. Wersland, 125 Idaho 499,
873 P.2d 144 (1994)).

C.

The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Sentencing Discretion By Revoking
Weathers' Probation
Weathers argues that the district court abused its discretion when it revoked his

probation.

(Appellant's brief, pp.17-19.)

"Probation is a matter left to the sound

discretion of the court." I.C. § 19-2601 (4). The decision to revoke probation is also
within the court's discretion. State v. Sanchez, 149 Idaho 102, 105, 233 P.3d 33, 36
(2009) (citing State v. Lafferty, 125 Idaho 378, 381, 870 P.2d 1337, 1340 (Ct. App.
1994)). In reviewing a district court's decision to revoke probation, this Court employs a
two-step analysis. Sanchez, 149 Idaho at 105, 233 P.3d at 36 (citation omitted). First,
the Court considers whether the defendant actually violated his probation.

~

"If it is

determined that the defendant has in fact violated the terms of his probation, the second
question is what should be the consequences of that violation."

14

~

A district court's

decision to revoke probation is a discretionary one that will not be overturned on appeal
absent an abuse of that discretion.

~

After Weathers committed multiple violations of the terms and conditions of his
probation, the district court properly revoked that probation. (R., pp.144-49.) Weathers
was not a model probationer.

Weathers violated the terms and conditions of his

probation by consuming alcohol, failing to report his contact with police to his probation
officer, viewing pornography, using the internet, and entering into a sexual relationship
with C.J. without approval from his probation officer or therapist. (R., pp.90-91.) After
Weathers' admissions, the district court concluded that he "violated the terms and
conditions of probation" and "demonstrated an inability to conform his conduct to the
requirements necessary to successfully complete the term of probation," yet gave him a
second chance to be successful on probation. (R., pp.106-09.) The district court added
a condition to Weathers' probation that he could only be involved with C.J. if approved
by his probation officer or therapist, explaining that "[a]ny unapproved association will
be considered a violation of the terms and conditions of probation." (R., pp.106-09.)
Six months later, Weathers again violated the terms and conditions of his
probation by continuing his relationship with C.J. without the approval of his probation
officer or therapist, viewing pornography, getting suspended from his sex offender
treatment program due to his "continued violations of treatment rules and guidelines,"
and frequenting a bar. (R., pp.113-15.) After an evidentiary hearing, the district court
found that Weathers had violated his probation as alleged. (12/13/2011 Tr., p.166, L.12
- p.168, L.1.)

In the subsequent disposition hearing, in addition to concluding that

Weathers violated

his probation and was not conforming his conduct to the
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requirements of his probation, the district court also concluded that Weathers was "no
longer entitled to the privilege afforded him by the Court's granting of probation in this
case" and revoked probation. (R., pp.146-47.)
Weathers' assertions on appeal that his probation violations were insignificant
and he was making progress-despite his having unapproved sexual relationships,
consistent viewing of pornography, consuming alcohol and frequenting bars, failing to
report interactions with police to his probation officer, and failing to meaningfully
participate in sex offender treatment as a sex offender--do not establish an abuse of
the district court's discretion. Considering Weathers' repeated failure to meaningfully
participate in his treatment program and follow its rules, his probation was not meeting
the goals of rehabilitation or protecting society. The district court properly exercised its
discretion when it revoked Weathers' probation.

D.

The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion By Not Sua Sponte Reducing
Weathers' Sentence Pursuant To Idaho Criminal Rule 35
After the district court revoked Weathers' probation, it executed Weathers'

underlying sentence of ten years with three years fixed. (R., pp.147-49.) On appeal,
Weathers argues that the district court abused its discretion by not sua sponte reducing
his sentence pursuant to Rule 35. (Appellant's brief, pp.19-21.) Weathers has failed to
show an abuse of discretion.
Upon revoking probation, the district court may, pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule
35, reduce an underlying sentence sua sponte.

I.C.R. 35. A court's decision not to

reduce a sentence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion subject to the well-established
standards governing whether a sentence is excessive. State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho
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26, 27, 218 P.3d 5, 7 (Ct. App. 2009); State v. Marks, 116 Idaho 976, 978, 783 P.2d
315, 317 (Ct. App. 1989)).

Where a sentence is legal, those standards require an

appellant to establish that the sentence is a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Baker,
136 Idaho 576, 577, 38 P.3d 614, 615 (2001) (citing State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831,
11 P.3d 27 (2000)). To carry this burden, the appellant must show that the sentence is
excessive under any reasonable view of the facts. Baker, 136 Idaho at 577, 38 P.3d at
615.

A sentence is reasonable if appropriate to achieve the primary objective of

protecting society, and any or all of the related sentencing goals of deterrence,
rehabilitation, or retribution.
(1978).

State v. Wolfe, 99 Idaho 382, 384, 582 P.2d 728, 730

In deference to the trial judge, the Court will not substitute its view of a

reasonable sentence where reasonable minds might differ. State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho
565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982).
Weathers, at age 36, sexually molested a 13-year-old girl, fondling her breasts
and passionately kissing her, while she was at his house visiting his daughter. (PSI,
pp.2-3.) Despite this crime, after serving a period of retained jurisdiction, the district
court gave Weathers an opportunity at probation.

(R., pp.81-86.)

Weathers failed,

violating his probation by, among other things, entering sexual relationships that were
not approved by his probation officer or therapist.

(R., pp.90-91.) The district court

gave Weathers another opportunity to succeed, continuing him on probation and
reminding him that "[a]ny unapproved association will be considered a violation of the
terms and conditions of probation."

(R., pp.106-09.)

Weathers again violated his

probation by, among other things, continuing to have sexual relationships that were not
approved by his probation officer or therapist. (R., pp .113-15.)
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Below, Weathers filed a Rule 35 motion requesting a reduction of sentence. (R.,
pp.152-53.) In its order denying Weathers' Rule 35 motion, the district court explained
why it refused to reduce Weathers' sentence. (See R., pp.168-74.) The state adopts
the district court's rationale as its argument on appeal. Execution of the district court's
relatively lenient sentence of ten years with only three years fixed protects the
community from Weathers, who has not shown himself capable of engaging in only
approved of sexual relationships, offers him the opportunity for rehabilitation while in
confinement, and may deter future sexual misconduct. The district court did not abuse
its discretion by not sua sponte reducing Weathers' sentence upon revoking his
probation. The district court should be affirmed.

CONCLUSION

The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's order
revoking Weathers' probation.

DATED this 20th day of December, 2012.

( 3'f!::::ER

Deputy Attorney General
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